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THE "TERMINATOR" PATENT AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: RETHINKING THE NORMATIVE DEFICIT

IN UTILITY TEST OF MODERN PATENT LAW
IKECHI MGBEOJI*

In the popular narrative, the tale of patents is the stirring saga of a
legal mechanism devoted to the promotion of socially useful inventions. In
this endless epic, which is often retold with little critical ability, the patent
system is depicted as the valiant protector of ingenious minds from the
nefarious activities of pilferers, imitators, and free riders. Implicit in this
idealized narrative of patents is the notion that only inventions that are
socially useful are protectable by the patent system. The converse position
is that inventions that are "immoral" or "dangerous" cannot be the proper
subject of patents. This romantic notion of patents and patentability is so
pervasive in the popular imaginings of patents that patented inventions that
seem "immoral" or "dangerous" are visited with dismay, incredulity, and
sometimes, outrage by members of the public. Implicit in this emerging
feeling of discomfort with patents on inventions of questionable usefulness
to society is the policy direction, or lack thereof, of the major patent
systems of the world.
In recent times, biotechnological inventions such as genetically
modified life forms have rekindled the debate on whether ethical,
environmental and social criteria ought to play a role in determining the
patentability or otherwise of an invention. Amidst this debate, no other
criterion of patentability has suffered as much misconception and
misunderstanding as the requirement of utility. Upon a careful examination
of the issues, it would seem that public outrage or indignation with patents
issued to biotechnological inventions that challenge the boundaries of
morality and ethics, stems in part from a popular misapprehension or
ignorance of the jurisprudence on utility in contemporary patent law. In
effect, public misapprehension of the concept of utility in patent law is a
function of the conflation of what a patent is with what a patented invention
ought to achieve for society. In other words, members of the public seem
to have a non-technical and antiquated understanding of the criterion of
* L.L.B., (Nigeria) B.L., (Lagos) L.L.M (summa cum laude), J.S.D. (summa cum laude),
(Dalhousie). Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. The
usual disclaimer applies. This article is dedicated to my recently deceased father, Levi Esiwoko
Mgbeoji. Papa, farewell.
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utility in the determination of whether a particular invention is fit for patent
protection or not. Put simply, in the popular parlance, utility of inventions
is often understood as social usefulness.
Arguably, no other biotechnological invention has been excoriated
with so much confused rhetoric on "utility" as the invention relating to
Genetic Use Restriction Technologies ("GURTs"), patented in the United
States, Canada, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark and many other
countries.' Otherwise known by their rather inflammatory nickname of
"terminator patents," GURTs have become the lightning rod for both
At the heart of the controversy is a
technophiles and Luddites.2
misunderstanding of the changed meaning of the concept of utility in patent
law. This paper argues that while the public understanding of utility as
social usefulness is well grounded in the history of patent law, modem
development in the jurisprudence of utility has not been stagnant. To the
contrary, utility in patent law has moved from puritanical notions to its
current articulation as the ability of an invention to do what it promises to
do as per the disclosure filed with the patent office.
In other words, the test of utility is no longer anchored on whether the
alleged invention is socially useful or ethically permissible. Rather, the
overriding criterion in modem patent law is whether the alleged invention
performs or fulfils what it predicts to do as per its disclosure. In order to
appreciate this shift, it has to be borne in mind that across the centuries,
courts in various jurisdictions have evolved in their conception of what
utility means in patent law. From an original focus on social usefulness
with a puritanical slant, utility has moved to a struggle between social
usefulness and mechanical operability and now to mechanical
predictability. Consequently, I argue in this paper that a fundamental
misconception in the recent criticisms against the utility or otherwise of
"terminator" technologies is that utility is mistaken for its original notion of
social usefulness. The present reality is that utility of inventions has
1. The "terminator patent" has been issued in France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Romania, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom. Similar applications are pending in Brazil,
Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Slovak Republic. See Defend Food Sovereignty:
Terminate Terminator, ETC GROUP 1, Jan. 2002, available at http://www.etcgroup.org
/documents/terminatorbrochure02.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) [hereinafter "Defend Food
Sovereignty: Terminate Terminator"].
2. In 1811 Nedd Ludd led a rebellion in the English Midlands against the introduction of
machines in the British textile industry. Since then, the term "Luddites" has become a pejorative
term reserved for those opposed to new technologies, particularly biotechnologies. See Y9
Luddites, at http://www.pages.zdnet.com/stanleytech/publicwork/id9.html (last visited Sept. 12,
2004).

2004]

THE "TERMINATOR" PA TENT

weaned itself from the high-minded impulses of the Venetian patent system
and the British Statute of Monopolies.
Using the terminator technology as a case study, I argue that the
social deficit implicit in an overly technical conception of utility leaves
much to be desired. If the patent system desires to reclaim its original
intent of including social relevance as part of the criteria for the protection
of inventions, it must rethink its excessive focus on mechanical operability
of inventions. The consequences of an excessive deference to technical
wizardry manifested in inventions, especially in the context of
environmental protection and biodiversity promotion, are too enormous.
Modem patent systems need to outgrow their pretense that social and
ecological factors are not legitimate factors for determining utility of
inventions.
Towards reclaiming its original social focus, clear and unambiguous
legislative provisions or criteria must be put in place to ensure that society
does not subsidize inventions that are harmful to the environment or
unnecessarily imperil other life forms. Every patent is a sort of subsidy to
the inventor. It is hardly prudent for the state, as a social entity, to
subsidize inventions that enrich an inventor while excessively endangering
genetic diversity and ecological integrity.
At the philosophical level, the major question addressed in this paper
is the propriety of granting patent protection to technologies that undermine
the conceptual foundation of the patent system and frustrate the intended
goal of rewarding inventors of socially useful inventions. Regrettably,
debates on the compatibility of patent protection with GURTs, and the
implications of these technologies for genetic diversity and sustainable
agriculture, have largely been of a rhetorical nature, thus beclouding the
serious intellectual property rights questions and environmental challenges
posed by the application of GURTs to plant biodiversity and agriculture.
GURTs represent an extremely powerful form of control or
ownership and exploitation of life forms beyond the contemplation of the
policies underlying the patent system. While patents are designed to
transfer valuable information to the public after the duration of the patent
term, GURTs ensure that the ultimate control of the genetic traits of the
patented life forms remains perpetually in the hands of the patent holder.
This is an unusual form of monopoly that stretches the ambits of the patent
system beyond the limits generally intended by most patent systems.
While the technology may become part of the public domain after the
expiration of the patent term, the peculiar nature of the technologies
ensures that farmers are permanently tied to seed merchants. Another
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worrisome aspect of this is the impact such technologies have on farmers'
recognized privilege or "right" to replant saved seeds. The end users of
GURT-patented products depend on the holders of the technologies for the
continued supply of new seeds and activation of desired traits long after the
formal expiration of the patent term. There is in substance no real recourse
to the public domain, at least not in the immediate view, since all the
regulatory controls and triggers associated with GURTs are biologically
driven and outlast the patent term.3 Consequently, I argue in this paper that
the application of patents to GURTs flies in the face of the fundamental
policy justification of the patent system as a mechanism for the regulated
release of valuable information and benefit to the public.
More importantly, the probable negative impact of GURT patents on
plant and agro-biodiversity raises serious issues concerning sustainable use
of plant biodiversity. Within this context, I examine the anti-public domain
ramifications of GURTs, and engage with conceptual and/or policy
arguments against the granting of patent protection on GURTs. I argue that
although GURTs and related technologies are, technically speaking,
inventions, whether they are socially useful is a matter of debate.
Consequently, there is a compelling need to explore other procedures or
prescriptions needed to mitigate the negative implications of patented
GURTs on sustainable agriculture and genetic diversity. In the main, this
article explores the issue of whether current patent law on utility of
inventions has lost its original social impulse, and thus is in need of a
rethink.
For clarity of analysis, this article is divided into three parts. In the
first part, I introduce the technologies of GURTs and their main
characteristics. In the second part, I examine the origins and policy
foundations of the patent system, particularly how the courts in various
jurisdictions have defined the concept of utility. The second part also
explores the evolution of the requirement of utility and its contemporary
emergence as a secular, technical test with emphasis on mechanical
operability of inventions. The third part of this article explores the nature
of GURT patents vis-a-vis their compatibility with the stated policy
imperatives of the patent regime. In addition, the third part evaluates the
propriety of GURT patents in the context of international law on
biodiversity protection and the precautionary approach to release of
genetically modified life forms into the environment.
3. Derek Eaton et al., Economic and Policy Aspects of 'Terminator' Technology, 49
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT MONITOR 19-22, available at http://www.biotechmonitor.nl/4907.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Eaton].
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PART ONE
"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, BEHOLD THE TERMINATOR!"

In early 1998, a U.S. based corporation, Delta and Pine Land
Company, in conjunction with the United States Department of
Agriculture, was awarded U.S. Patent number 5,723,765 in re: Control of
Plant Gene Expression.4 The biological control of seed fertility, that is,
Genetic Use Restriction Technology, otherwise known by the inflammatory5
nickname of "terminator," refers to plants that are genetically engineered
to produce sterile seeds. These seeds are different from hybrid seeds
because hybrid seeds are not sterile and offer, at least in theory, the benefits
of "improved agronomic performance. 6 The essence of the claims in the
patent application filed by Delta and Pine Land Company is that plant
genes were engineered to kill their own seeds in the second generation.7
Terminator technologies thus refer to those biotechnological innovations
designed to suppress true-to-type second-generation seeds (genetic copy
propagation). 8 In simple terms, "terminator technology" fosters the
containment of outright germination of seeds and/or deliberate control of
customized genetic traits thereof.
An immediate consequence of such technologies is that farmers
cannot replant genetically modified crops by merely saving seed. This is
an enormous leap from the previous regime on ownership of the means of
controlling plant genetic expression. As Alejandro Segarra and Jean
Rawson explain, "[t]his patent gives the holders rights for the use of three
new gene sequences that block the production of fertile seeds in genetically
The technology involves "complex genetic
engineered plants."9
transformations that insert a genetic 'on-off switch' in plants to prevent the

4. Martha Crouch, How The Terminator Terminates: An Explanationfor the Non-Scientist
of a Remarkable Patent for Killing Second-Generation Seeds of Crop Plants, EDMONDS

(Revised ed. 1998), available at http://www.edmonds-institute.org/crouch.html (last
visited Sept. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Crouch].
5. Id. (Genetic engineering may be defined as the process in which the arrangement or
patterns of proteins in an organism is artificially manipulated to yield novel results. The process
of moving one gene to another within the same species is known as transformation).
INSTITUTE,

6. Defend Food Sovereignty: Terminate Terminator, supra note

1, available at

http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/terminatorbrochure02.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
7. Crouch, supranote 4.
8. Alejando Segarra, et al, The 'Terminator Gene' and Other Genetic Use Restriction
Technologies (GURTs) in Crops, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, October 21, 1999, available at

http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-83.cfm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004)
(hereinafter Segarra].
9. Id.
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unauthorized use of genetic characteristics contained within."'
Following the 1998 joint patent application granted to Delta and Pine
Land Company and the United States Department of Agriculture,
terminator technologies have generated significant debates, if not
controversy, in many circles and among stakeholders in agrobiotechnology, especially, farmers."
A possible explanation for the
outpouring of concern is that the use of terminator seeds would prevent
farmers from replanting genetically modified crops by merely saving the
patented seed. It would, however, be unfair to examine the controversy
surrounding terminator patents from the narrower standpoint or perspective
of farmers and environmental activists.
Farmers are not the only
Inventors and investors in such
stakeholders in this technology.
technologies have legitimate interests in GURTs too. In the opinion of the
patent holders, terminator patents would ensure intellectual "property
protection for investments in genetic engineering and help create incentives
to develop new plant varieties that satisfy changing market demands."' 2
What is the science behind GURTs? At the practical level, GURTs
foster control of seeds at two principal levels, namely: specific seed
variety, otherwise known as V-GURTs,13 and specific trait(s), otherwise
known as T-GURTs.14 The former denies unlicensed access to an entire
plant variety while the latter is designed to restrict access at the trait level. 5
The biological mechanisms of terminator technologies are often
complicated and somewhat difficult to explain to those not steeped in the
arcane world of molecular biology. However, a crude summary which may
be offered to explain the way terminator technologies work is that plant
seeds are genetically engineered in such a manner that the affected plants
grow normally but at the point of maturation, when seeds are to be
produced, a toxin would be produced to kill the seed without otherwise
affecting other characteristics of the plant.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Eaton, supra note 3 at 19-22. An example of the V-GURT is the 1998 patent granted to
the United States Department of Agriculture and Delta & Pine Land Corp. Similar patents have
been issued to Novartis Corp., and Monsanto Corp., respectively. (U.S. Patent No. 5650505,
(Issued July 22, 1997)).
14. Id. According to Segarra and Lawson, examples of T-GURT patents are Zeneca Ltd's

(UK), entitled "Cysteine protease promoter from oil seed rape and a method for the containment
of germplasm" issued on October 2, 1997; and Purdue Research Foundation's "Selective
Expression of Genes in Plants" patent issued on March 11, 1999. See Segarra, supra note 8.
15. Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Subsidiary
Body of Scientific, Technical and TechnologicalAdvice, Montreal, June 21-25, 1999, at 4.6.
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In effect, the second generation of the plant is eliminated. 6 Using
cotton as a hypothetical example, Martha Crouch explains that the process
of a terminator technology would operate as follows:
The system has three key components: 1. A gene for a toxin that will
kill the seed late in development, but that will not kill any other part of
the plant. 2. A method for allowing a plant breeder to grow several
generations of cotton plants, already genetically-engineered to contain
the seed-specific toxin gene, without any seeds dying.... 3. A method
for activating the engineered seed-specific toxin gene after the farmer
plants the seeds, so that the farmer's second generation will be killed.
These three tasks are accomplished by engineering a series of genes,
which are all transferred permanently to the plant,
17 so that they are
passed on via the normal reproduction of the plant.
It is important to note that the essence of terminator technologies is to
make a lot of toxic proteins in the embryo of the seed that will kill the cells
of the plant's seeds. The preferred toxin used by molecular biologists to
achieve this end seems to be a ribosome inhibitor protein ("RIP") obtained
from the Saponaria Officinalis plant. 8 As Martha Crouch explains, this
protein works in small quantities as it stops the synthesis of all other
proteins.19 In the absence of crucial proteins needed for other life
processes, the embryonic cells die quickly. The supreme benefit in using
the ribosome inhibitor protein (RIP) is that it is non-toxic to organisms
other than plants.2" More subtly, the toxic protein is limited or confined to
the seeds.
In order to achieve this objective, plant genetic engineers desirous of
creating a terminator gene and expressing it in a plant, for example, cotton,
would "take the promoter from a gene normally activated late in seed
development ... and to fuse that promoter to the coding sequence 2 ' of a
protein that will kill an embryo going through the last stages of
development." The authors use a promoter from a cotton LEA (Late
This gene is one of the last to be
Embryogenesis Abundant) gene.
activated.23 In order to activate the toxin gene, the germinating seeds
would be treated with the antibiotic, tetracycline, before the seeds are sold
16. Crouch, supra note 4.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The coding sequence is that part of a DNA which contains the 'code' for the order of
amino acids in the protein.
22. Crouch, supra note 4.
23. Id. The promoter is that part of a DNA responsible for interacting with the cell or the
environment.
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to farmers.24 As Martha Crouch further explains:
The tetracycline would interact with the repressor protein, keeping it
Recombinase
from interfering with production of recombinase
would be made, cutting out the blocking DNA from the toxin gene.
The toxin gene would now be capable of making toxin, but would not
actually do so until the end of seed development. The next generation
would thus be killed.26
This biotechnological intervention practically confers on the seed
producer, the power to determine when to set the so-called terminator in
motion and, at least in theory, protect the variety in perpetuity, even after
the expiration of the patent grant. The point here is that as soon as the
transgenic plant completes its life cycle and turns on to actual seed
development, the development of the plant is brought to a genetically
programmed end. The immediate consequence, at least for farmers, is that
they are deprived of the ability to harvest viable seeds from the plant. The
farmer is thus compelled to return to the seed merchant every farming
season if he/she intends to remain in the business. Although V-GURTs
account for a majority of such patents issued, both forms of genetic use
restriction technology ultimately achieve the same result. The question that
arises is whether such inventions meet the requirement of utility in patent
law. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to carefully examine
the origins, rationale, and evolution of the utility requirement in patent law.
PART TWO
2.1: THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF SOCIAL USEFULNESS AND THE
NORMATIVE DEFICIT IN PATENT UTILITY TEST
From a careful historical development of case law and academic
commentaries on the requirements of patentability, it would seem that in
patent law, utility has not been a stagnant, fixed concept; rather, its
In
attributes have shown remarkable flux, malleability, and change.
articulating the evolution of the test of "utility" in patent law, I argue that
three historical stages are evident from case law analysis. First, utility was
originally a socio-economic concept anchored on puritanical notions.
Second, and more importantly, utility became a technical concept with an
eye on a secular notion of social usefulness. At the third stage of its
development, utility has been largely constructed as a purely technical
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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concept with little or no regard for public morality, ethics, or social
usefulness of inventions. In the history of patent law, these three stages tell
the story of the evolution of the professionalization of the patent
examination process.
Are terminator patents useful? It is hardly deniable that terminator
seeds are not the irredeemable evil they are often made out to be by their
discontents. To the contrary, terminator seeds confer some economic, and
perhaps agronomic, benefits to the users and to their patentees. More
specifically, terminator seeds have been known to increase productivity
from improved inputs due to increased research and development
Similarly, plant breeders also benefit from increased
investment.
appropriation of research benefits from new products. On the side of the
government, it could be argued that benefits are derived from reduced
investment requirements in breeding and fewer enforcement costs for plant
variety protection ("PVP"). For the larger society, it could be contended
that benefits take the form of increased agricultural productivity. If
terminator seeds were absolutely useless, they would not sell in the
marketplace.
On the flip side, however, the question is whether there are serious
risks involved with the use of terminator seeds. Certainly there are serious
risks with terminator seeds. First, there is the obvious risk of misuse of the
monopoly by plant breeders. There is also a danger of corporate vertical
integration of the means and processes of agriculture. Third, terminator
seeds increase the risk of seed insecurity and impede access to genetic
improvements. Fourth, given the increasing trend of genetic monocultures
and extinction of species across the globe, there is little doubt that
terminator seeds exacerbate a worrying situation arising from genetic
pollution and sterilization of otherwise fertile seeds.
Leaving aside, briefly, the question of environmental and ecological
risks posed by the use of terminator seeds, the central issue is whether
terminator seeds are useful in the context of utility patent law. In order to
give a correct answer to this question, reference must be made to the
juridical characteristics of the utility requirement in patent law and how the
criterion of utility has evolved over the years across many jurisdictions.
2.2: THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF UTILITY TEST IN PATENT LAW
The origins and development of the patent system are often the
subject of ideological reconstruction of history.27 Although the most
27. Ikechi Mgbeoji, The Juridical Origins of the InternationalPatent System:

Towards a
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common narrative, perhaps myth, of the origins of patents is that patents
arose from the British Industrial Revolution." Legal historians with a less
ideological disposition are virtually unanimous in their conclusion that
modem patents actually originated in medieval Florence and Venice. The
modem system of patents, and in it the seeds of utility test, is based on the
confrontation between the medieval architect, builder and artist, Filippo
Brunelleschi and the city of Florence.29 In 1421, Brunelleschi built a seacraft, christened el Badalone, and refused to disclose the invention to the
city of Florence unless a patent was issued to him. Yielding to his threats
of non-disclosure of the invention,30 the city of Florence, by a public letter
dated 19 June 1421, granted him a limited monopoly on the use of the seacraft. Given the seminal nature of the letter, particularly its conception of
utility of patented inventions, a translated version of the letter is reproduced
in extenso:
The Magnificent and Powerful Lords, Lords Magistrate, and Standard

Bearer of Justice:
Considering that the admirable Filippo Brunelleschi, a man of the most
perspicacious intellect, industry, and invention, citizen of Florence, has
invented some machine or kind of ship, by means of which he think he
can easily, at any time, bring in any merchandise and load on the river
Amo and on any other river or water, for less money than usual, and
Historiography of the Role of Patents in Industrialization, 5 J. HIST. OF INT'L L. 399, 399-418

(2003).
28. For example, H.G. Fox wrongly enthused that "it was not by accident that the patent
system had its origin in England, nor. that the industrial revolution was the inevitable
consequence."

See ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT PATENTS-THE NETHERLANDS,

1869-1912, SWITZERLAND, 1850-1907 9 (Princeton University Press, 1971). Despite the absence
of both historical and empirical support, one reason many patent attorneys prefer to locate the
origin of patents in the British industrial revolution is to make the assertion that the
institutionalization of patents is necessary for the industrialization of states. Be that as it may, an
overwhelming majority of the most reputable inquiry into the issue have failed to find any
organic or causative link between patents and industrialization. See generally, Fritz Machlup, An
Economic Review of the Patent System, Senate Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and

Copyrights of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 85th Cong. at 79 (1958); T.S. ASHTON, THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1760-1830 (Oxford University Press, 1948); PHYLLIS DEANE, THE
FIRST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (Cambridge University Press, 1980). Interestingly, the British

industrial revolution took off nearly 150 years after the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies
(the first genuine British Patent law). Similarly, industrialization in medieval Italy was nearly
200 hundred years old before any patent law was enacted in the region. However, for a typical
rhetoric on the alleged causative links between patents and industrialization, see Robert
Sherwood, et al, Promotion of Inventiveness in Developing Countries Through a More Advanced
Patent Administration, 39 J.L. & TECH. 473, (1999) Robert Sherwood, Human Creativity for
Economic Development: PatentsPropel Technology 33 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2000).
29. Owen Lippert, One Trip to the Dentist is Enough, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 131 (Owen Lippert ed., 1999).

30. Id.
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with several other benefits to merchants and others; and that he refuses
to make such machine available to the public, in order that the fruit of
his genius and skill may not be reaped by another without his will and
consent; and that, if he enjoyed some prerogative concerning this, he
would open up what he is hiding and would disclose it to all;
And desiring that this matter, so withheld and hidden without fruit,
shall be brought to light, to be of profit to both said Filippo and our
whole country and others, and that some privilege be created for said
Filippo, as hereinafter described, so that he may be animated more
fervently to even higher pursuits and stimulated to more subtle
investigations, deliberated on 19 June 1421:
That no person alive, in being, and of whatever status, dignity, quality,
and grade, shall dare or presume, within three years next following
from the day when the present provision has been approved in the
Council of Florence, to commit any of the following acts on the river
Arno, any other river, stagnant water or swamp, or water running or
existing in the territory of Florence: (a) to have, hold, or use in any
manner, be it newly invented or made new in form, a machine or ship
or other instrument designed to import ship or transport on water any
merchandise or any things or goods, except such ship or machine or
instrument as they may have used until now for similar operations, or
(b) to ship or transport, or to have shipped and transported any
merchandise or goods on ships, machines, or instruments for water
transport other than such as were familiar and usual until now; and
further that any such or newly shaped machine, etc. shall be burned;
Provided however that the foregoing shall not be held to cover, and
shall not apply to, any newly invented of newly shaped machine, etc.
designed to Ship, transport or travel on water, which may be made by
Filippo Brunelleschi or with his will and consent; also, that any
merchandise, things or goods which may be shipped with such newly
invented ships within three years following, shall be free from
imposition, requirement or levy of any new tax not previously
imposed.31
As per the Florentine patent issued to Filippo Brunelleschi, it is clear
that the policy imperative underlying the issuance of the patent was to
encourage Brunelleschi and similarly talented persons to make socially
beneficial and useful inventions.32
There is little question among patent historians that Brunelleschi's
patent was a real and legally valid patent, as "good in subject matter as any

31.

(1946);

See generally Frank Prager, Brunelleschi's Patent, 28 J. PATENT OFFICE SOC'Y 109
GUSTINA SCAGLIA, BRUNELLESCHI:

STUDIES OF His TECHNOLOGY AND INVENTIONS

(Cambridge Press 1970); see also ULF ANDERFELT, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LEGISLATION AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Martinus Nijhoff ed., The Hague 197 1) [hereinafter Anderfelt].
32. Anderfelt, supra note 31.
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of those dealt with in 1947 by the British patent office"33 or by any modern
patent office for that matter. Although the Badalone sank on its debut on
Lake Arno there is no doubt that its Venetian successor was anchored on
the economic and social usefulness of inventions. The express words of the
celebrated Venetian patent statute of 1474 are crystal clear on the need for
patents to have social and public relevance and utility.3 4

The Venetian

patent act is reproduced as follows:
[T]here are in this city, and also there come temporarily by reason of

its greatness and goodness, men from different places and most clever
minds, capable of devising and inventing all manner of ingenious
contrivances.
And should it be provided, that the works and
contrivances invented by them, others having seen them could not
make them and take their honor, men of such kind would exert their
minds, invent and make things which would be of no small utility and
benefit to our State. Therefore, decision will be passed that, by

authority of this Council, each person who will make in this city any
new ingenious contrivance, not made heretofore in our dominion, as
soon as it is reduced to perfection, so that it can be used and exercised,
shall give notice of the same to the office of our Provisioners of
Common. It being forbidden to any other in any territory and place of
ours to make any other contrivance in the form and resemblance
thereof, without the consent and license of the author up to ten years.
And, however, should anybody make it, the aforesaid author and
inventor will have the liberty to cite him before any office of this city,
by which office the aforesaid who shall infringe be forced to pay him

the sum of one hundred ducates and the contrivance immediately
destroyed. Being then in liberty of our Government at his will to take
and use in his need any of the said contrivances and instruments, with
this condition, however, that no others than the authors shall exercise
them."
Indeed, the British Statute of Monopolies, erroneously characterized
as the Magna Carta of inventors, clearly recognized that not all inventions
would necessarily benefit society.36 Hence, according to the Statute of
Monopolies of 1624, patents were not to be granted to inventions that were

"mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities at home, or
hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient" to society.37

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; See also Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents and TraditionalKnowledge of the Uses of Plants:
Is a Communal Patent Regime Part of the Solution to the Scourge of Biopiracy?, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 163 (2001).
36. David Vaver, Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes, 69 CAN. B. R. 28

(1990).
37. English Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, sched. 6 (Eng.). But see AGNEW,
AGNEW ON PATENTS (1974) (arguing that "this condition is not imposed by the Statute of
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These legal provisions offer support for the view that patents were
originally designed to be responsive to social and public welfare.3" For
inventions to be patentable, they "must perform some function of positive
benefit to society."" It was within this understanding of the concept of
utility that courts in the United States, United Kingdom, et cetera,
invalidated inventions, which from a puritanical point of view were
immoral, "mischievous" or could be used for "immoral" or "mischievous"
Such inventions, for example, gambling machines or
purposes.4 °
contrivances, were deemed "useless" and thus unpatentable.
Parke, B., in Morgan v. Seaward warned that "an invention which is
altogether useless may well be considered as mischievous to the state, to
Patents on inventions,
the hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient."'
which were merely taken out for the purpose of impeding subsequent
improvements or to prevent the introduction of other inventions adapted to
the particular subject to which it was applicable, were invalidated on the
grounds that they lacked utility.42 And in the instances or cases where
inventions were deemed to be harmful to society, the patent office was not
obliged to grant patents to such inventions.43
Consequently, in the second stage of the evolution of the concept of
utility, the test or criterion of utility of inventions rested on a tripod,
namely, the operability and use of the alleged invention, achievement of
some limited human purpose, and finally, achieving a human purpose that
is not illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy.4 4 More importantly,
mischievous and immoral inventions, no matter how ingenious or operable,
were not worthy subjects of patent protection. 45 The pertinent test was on
the utility of the purpose of the invention, rather than a utility of means.

Monopolies ... but it is a condition required by the common law) [hereinafter AGNEW ON
PATENTS]. With all due respect, Agnew is wrong. Patents are statutory creatures, not products of
the common law.
38. This test stipulates that an invention "must not be a mere curiosity, a scientific process
exciting wonder yet not producing physical results, or a frivolous or trifling article or operation
not aiding in the progress nor increasing the possession of the human race." DONALD CHISUM, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 4-02 (1992)
[hereinafter Chisumn on Patents] (citing W. ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS OF
USEFUL INVENTIONS 463 (1890)). See also Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (D. Mass.
1817).
39. Chisum on Patents, supra note 38.
40. Morgan v. Seaward, 1 Webs. P.R. 197 (1837).
41. Id.
42. Agnew, supra note 37 at 74.
43. See, e.g., Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1018.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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However, this test was applied in such a manner that took into serious
consideration society's conception of social usefulness. In the early stages
of the development of the law, social conception of usefulness had a
puritanical and stem perspective.46
For example, in his instruction to the jury in the case of Lowell v.
Lewis, Justice Story of the U.S. Supreme Court advised that "[a]ll that the
law requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.47 The word 'useful,'
therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or
immoral.",48 Giving examples of inventions that fall within the category of
"immoral" or "mischievous" and hence lacking in utility, Justice Story
posited that "invention[s] to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to
facilitate private assassination" were outside the pale of 'useful'
inventions.4 9 Any such inventions were unpatentable, no matter how
efficiently they worked.
Remarkably, these judicial constructions of utility were wrought in
the United States where the patent system was relatively aggressive and
prided itself as a value-neutral institution.5 ° Yet, American courts tended to
follow Justice Story's ethical and moralistic construction of utility
requirement in patentability of inventions.5' Within this construct of utility,
various inventions relating to gambling devices or processes or products
useful only for the perpetration of fraud were denied patent protection for
lacking utility.52
Thus, public policy, and more importantly, a puritanical perspective
on utility influenced a lot of the cases involving "mischievous" or
"immoral" inventions. However, public policy, indeed puritanical notions,
hardly remain constant. They evolve, morph, and ultimately impact on
how the concept of utility is construed. In addition, the professionalization
46. Reliance Novelty v. Dworzek, 80 F. 902 (N.D. Cal. 1897) (rejecting a gambling device).
47. Id. at 1019.
48. Id. Reiterating this position of law in Bedford v. Hunt, Justice Story explained that the
"law does not look to the degree of utility; it simply requires, that it shall be capable of use, and
that the use is such as sound morals andpolicy do not discountenance or prohibit." 3 F. Cas. 37
(D. Mass. 1817) (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. For an excellent analysis of this trend see John Golden, Biotechnology, Technology
Policy, and Patentability: NaturalProductsand Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.

J. 101 (2001).
51. See, e.g., Bremer v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 n. 20 (1966).
52. See, e.g., Nat'l Automatic Device Co., v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (N.D. I11.
1889) (gambling
device rejected); Dworzek, 80. F. 902 (N.D. Cal. 1897) (another gambling device rejected);
Richard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900); Hall v. Duart Sales Co., 28 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Il1.
1939).
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of the corps of patent examiners is a contributory factor to the evolution of
the test of utility as a secular concept. It is for these combined reasons that
one may argue that inventions hitherto questioned on the grounds of
immorality or mischief to public benefit may today pass the test of utility.
It is worth detailing that the courts have, over the years, avoided applying
subjective ideas of morality and "mischief." In Ex ParteMurphy,53 a patent
claim for a gambling device known as the 'one-armed bandit,' the court
warned that "while some may consider gambling to be injurious to public
morals and the good order of society, we cannot find any basis in 35 U.S.C.
101 or related sections which justify a conclusion that inventions which are
useful only for gambling ipso facto are void of patentable utility. 54
Commenting on the fluid and evolving nature of public morality as relating
to what may or may not be considered useful inventions, Choate observes
that:
Courts have in some instances talked of 'morals, health, and good
order of society' in determining utility. Anyone whose life has
spanned a decade or two in the 20th Century has witnessed how moral
standards can change in a period of a few years. Gambling devices,
frowned upon early in the century, are legalized in several states;
racetracks and lotteries are now used to generate substantial amounts
of income in many states. Birth control devices, in a period of thirty to
forty years, have come from a position of illegality to where they are
welcomed by some as a means of curbing a population explosion.
Thus, in determining 'utility' based on public mores, the courts should
apply a test which will not penalize an inventor who may be prescient
enough to be anticipating basic needs of a society changed by forces
yet unrecognized by the general public.55
In the development of the jurisprudence on utility, the rule or
distinction emerged over the years that unless an invention was solely
'useful' for fraudulent or illegal activities, it could be patented. Such 'dual
use' or 'multiple use' inquiry into the uses of inventions meant that
inventions could not be debarred from patentability merely because one of
their many uses pertains to immoral or mischievous purposes. In other
words, a patent with several claims cannot be invalidated merely because
one of the claims relates to an immoral object. If an invention is useful for
one or more socially useful purposes, it passes the test of utility. In any
event, morality and public policy could be janus-headed or chameleonic
concepts. Commenting on this problematic aspect of patent law, Judge
53. 200 U.S.P.Q. 801 (Patent & Trademark Office Bd. App. 1977).
54. Id. at 802.
55. Chisum on Patents, supra note 37 at 4-17 (quoting ROBERT
CASES & MATERIALS 380 (1973)).
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Baker of the U.S. Seventh Circuit, quoting Walker, wryly reasoned that:
[A]n important question, relevant to utility in this respect, may
hereafter arise and call for judicial decision. It is perhaps true, for
example, that the invention of Colt's revolver was injurious to the
morals, and injurious to the health, and injurious to the good order of
society. That instrument of death may have been injurious to morals,
in tending to tempt and to promote the gratification of private revenge.
It may have been injurious to health, in that it is very liable to
accidental discharge, and thereby to cause wounds, and even homicide.
It may also have been injurious to good order, especially in the newer
part of the country, because it facilitates and increases private warfare

among frontiersmen. On the other hand, the revolver, by furnishing a
ready means of self-defense,
56 may sometimes have promoted morals
and health and good order.
Ultimately, in the second stage of the development of the test of
utility in patent law, the hypothesis was that utility meant everything useful
within the meaning of the law, if it was adapted to accomplish a good
result, even though it may often be used to accomplish disagreeable or bad
objectives.
In contemporary times, however, the refinement and
technicalization of the utility requirement now compels patent applicants to
ensure that the invention works as detailed in the disclosure with little or no
regard to public policy. This development may be attributed to the
secularization of science, the deregulation of morality, and diminished role
of religious bodies in articulating public policy. These factors have
combined to produce a conception of utility of inventions that leans in
favor of technical operability, while diminishing or even ignoring ethical or
moral issues arising from the claims of the patent application.
In modem patent law, thus, puritanical concerns or even the
environmental implications of the alleged invention are of no significance.
The central or dispositive question today in most patent systems across the
world is whether the invention works as predicted in the disclosure. It is
immaterial that the machine is impractical from a commercial viewpoint.
An ingenious device for making saltwater at great cost, which would not
have commercial use in the Dead Sea, is not invalid for inutility. Provided
the invention performs as indicated in the disclosure, it does not matter that
the Dead Sea is heavy with brine and that saltwater could be obtained from
a cheaper or more efficient device.57
As already noted, the overwhelming preponderance at the Patent

56.
1964).

57.

ARTHUR M. SMITH, PATENT LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND MATERIALS 412 (rev. ed.

See, e.g., P. NARAYANAN ON PATENT LAW 1057-1074 (2d ed. 1975).
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Examiner's Office of persons trained in the sciences has increasingly led to
a regime of greater emphasis on the scientific and technical aspects of the
utility of an invention. Patent examiners are not hired for their expertise in
ethics or morality. Virtually all patent examiners, whether employed fulltime by the government or hired on a retainer or consultancy basis are
scientists trained in the physical sciences. It is therefore to be expected that
in the discharge of their functions, their preoccupation would be with the
scientific and operational aspects of alleged inventions rather than with the
possible ethical or moral problems that may arise from the use of the
inventions.
Although most claims in patent applications are couched in nonrevealing words such as "improvements in apparatus for electric lighting"
or "improvements in methods of fermenting liquors,"58 it would seem that
stripped of the studied and deliberate opacity which claims are often known
for, patent examiners ultimately search for the operability of the alleged
invention when ascertaining the utility, or lack thereof, of an invention.
Shorn of the institutionalized vagueness which modem patent claims have
become notorious for, the determinative question often posed by patent law
on utility is whether the alleged patent is useful for the basic purposes or
purpose that the inventor alleges in his or her specification?5 9 Put simply,
patent examiners are not trained nor required to pass moral judgments on
inventions.60
However, a strict application of this doctrine of law would unduly
punish inventors for every imprudent puffing statement in a specification.
For this reason, courts in several jurisdictions have drawn a distinction
between material and non-material misrepresentation or false suggestion
contained in a specification. Patents are invalidated for inutility where
there is evidence of material misrepresentation. 6' Care must, however, be
taken not to equate misrepresentation with utility. The important point to
note here is that in modern patent law, insofar as the alleged invention
performs its vaunted or predicted task, even if some aspects of its
performance are "illicit" or ethically questionable, the test of utility would
58. CHARLES J. BANNON, AUSTRALIAN PATENT LAW 63 (Butterworths, 1984).
59. Tetra Molectric Ltd's Application [1977] RPC 290; see also In re Alsop's Patent (1907)
24 R.P.C. 733 at 753; dictum approved by the House of Lords in Hatmaker v. Joseph Nathan &

Co. Ltd., 36 R.P.C. 231 (1919).
60.

Ex Parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801 (Patent and Trademark Office Bd. of App., 1977);

see also ROBERT CHOATE & WILLIAM FRANCIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 378

(2d ed., 1981).
61. See Rex v. Arkwright, 1 Carp. P.C. 53, 61 (K.B. 1785). See also F. FETHERSTONHAUGH,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LETTERS PATENT OF INVENTION IN CANADA 339 (Carswell, 1926)
(hereinafter Fetherstonhaugh].
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be satisfied by the mere act of compliance with the specified objects.6" In
effect, it is apparent that over the years, patent law on utility has gradually
diminished the role of puritanical or moral considerations in the
determination of utility. In modem patent law, utility of invention depends
upon whether, by following the directions of the patentee, the results which
the patentee predicted to produce can in fact be produced.63
In addition to judicial (re)interpretations of utility, in some cases,
however, express legislation has been put in place to debar the patentability
of some inventions on grounds of public policy. 64 For example, inventions
in the atomic energy and space and aeronautic fields are generally not
patentable, even in the United States. 65
Inventions deemed to be
detrimental to the national security of states are often excluded from
patentability and may be kept secret or withheld by the state on grounds of
"national security. 66 Similar exceptions are created by sections 22, 20 (17)
of the Canadian Patent Act.67 In some cases, states may confiscate
inventions deemed to be dangerous if placed in the public domain.
In effect, notwithstanding various judicial attempts at diminishing the
social dimension of inventions, virtually all patent systems across the globe
62. Interestingly, Canadian courts have not been invited to adjudicate a case of inventions
with an illicit purpose. However, the Canadian patent office has been known to refuse patents
covering oleomargarine compounds due to the prohibition of the manufacture or sale of such
contained in the Criminal Code. See Fetherstonhaugh, supra note 61 at 351.
63. See Lane-Fox v. Kensington and Knightsbridge Elec. Lighting Co. Ltd., 9 R.P.C. 417
(1892).
64. See infra note 65.

65. See, e.g., The Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1988) (providing that "no patent
shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization
of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon."); see also National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. 2457; Virginia Geoffrey, Do the Atomic Energy
Act and the NASA Act Promote Adequate Advancement?, 43 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
624 (1961).
66. Section 181 of the United States Patent Act provides inter alia:
[W]henever the publication or disclosure of an invention by the granting of a patent,
in which the Government does not have a property interest might, in the opinion of
the Commissioner, be detrimental to the national security, he shall make the
application for patent in which such invention is disclosed available for inspection to
the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of Defense, and the chief officer of
any other department or agency of the Government designated by the President as a
defense agency of the United States .... If, in the opinion of the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Secretary of a Defense Department[,] . . .the publication or
disclosure of the invention by the granting of a patent therefor would be detrimental
to the national security, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of a Defense
Department... shall notify the Commissioner and the Commissionershall order that
the invention be kept secret and shall withhold the grant of a patent for such a period
as the national interest requires ....

35 U.S.C. § 181 (2000) (emphasis added).
67. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., c. P4 (1993 Can.).
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recognize that society is not obliged to issue patents to inventions merely
because the invention's manifest genius. Indeed, at international law,
Article 27 (3) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs),68 notwithstanding its very liberal provisions,
provides for public policy considerations in granting patents to inventions
that constitute a danger to society. Article 27 (3) provides as follows:
"[s]ubject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application."69
The exceptions stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 are that:
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to
the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely
because the exploitation is prohibited by [their] law.
3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment
of humans or animals:
(b) Plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals other than non-biological and micro-biological
processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection
of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis
system or by a combination of thereof.U
In other words, there is overwhelming historical and juridical support
for the position championed by some scholars of patents that patent offices
are not necessarily obligated to issue patents on all manner of new
contrivances or inventions merely because those inventions are workable
and are products of genius. As a society, we may be right to require that
inventors demonstrate the social value of their inventions as part of the
requirements for patentability of inventions. In effect, the patent system
has historically shown itself responsive to social needs and sensitivities.
If the argument that the test of utility is neither an exercise in
puritanical inquisition nor an amoral worship at the altar of technical
68. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
69. Id. at Art. 27 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
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efficiency, it follows that modem biotechnological inventions which have a
high probability of endangering society should be legitimate targets of
scrutiny, care, and deliberation. Within this context, the question becomes
whether genetic user restriction technologies or the so-called terminator
patents fall within the rubric of inventions lacking utility. As some critics
have pointed out, the essence of sterilized seeds is to offer seed companies
the opportunity to maximize their profits by tying the hands of farmers in
their ability to replant second generation seeds from sterilized seeds.
Through genetic manipulation, the technologies in issue cause the affected
plants to become sterile at the point of harvest.
In effect, every growing season, farmers would be compelled to return
to commercial seed corporations to purchase new planting seeds rather than
save "and replant their own seed as farmers have done for 12 millennia."71
This has been likened by a leading non-governmental organization to "bioserfdom. 7 2 Naturally, this biological "ever-greening" of a patented
technology raises significant questions about the role of patents in a
competitive world economy and more importantly, whether a purely
mechanical conception of the test of utility is outdated.
PART THREE
THE UTILITY OR LACK THEROF OF TERMINATOR PATENTS:
A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE?
Part of the attraction GURTs hold for biotechnological seed
merchants is that they dispense with the need for license agreements and
end-user contracts between seed merchants and farmers. In this sense, it
can be argued that terminator patents serve a useful purpose to seed
developers such as Cargill, Aventis, or Monsanto. Over the years, seed

71. Press Release, ETC Group, Traitor Resolutions? (June 25, 1999), available at
http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/newstraitor.pdf [hereinafter Traitor Resolutions].
72. ETC GROUP, TERMINATOR BROCHuRE 2002 1, available at http://www.etcgroup.org
/documents/terminatorbrochure02.pdf [hereinafter Terminator Brochure].
According to the ETC Group,
[O]ver 1.4 billion people - mostly the rural poor - depend on farm-saved seeds as their
primary seed source. If a farmer loses the ability to save her seed, she cannot select
plants that are best adapted to local conditions and needs. Communities that lose
control over their seeds risk losing control of their farming systems and becoming
dependent on outside sources of seeds and the inputs they require. Without an
agricultural system adapted to a community and its specific ecosystem, national food
security is impossible. History makes it clear that poor countries cannot rely upon
rich nations to secure their food nourishments. The use of food as a political weapon
- even as a form of economic biological warfare - continues even today.
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producers such as Monsanto have found themselves embroiled in lawsuits
with farmers over alleged violations of agreements designed to prevent the
saving of patented seeds for replanting.73 Typically, seed companies
license their biotechnology products to interested farmers. A general
clause in such a license contract requires farmers to use the geneticallyengineered seeds for only one season of planting and not to save and
replant saved seeds the next season. Needless to say, the major seed
producers have had to sue many farmers for alleged violations of this
important clause. The litigation involving a Saskatchewan farmer and
Monsanto Corporation readily comes to mind.74 Hence, in the absence of
an effective and reliable monitoring of how patented seeds are used by
farmers, biological control of patented seeds holds undoubted attraction for
seed developers.
Patentees of terminator patents have thus acknowledged "that the real
purpose of the technology is not agronomic but economic - to force farmers
to become repeat customers."7 5 According to a full page advertorial run by
Monsanto Corporation in 1997,
[i]t takes millions of dollars and years of research to develop the
biotech crops that deliver superior value to growers. And future
investment in biotech research depends on companies' ability to share
in the added value created by these crops. Consider what happens if
growers save and replant patented seed. First, there is less incentive
for all companies to invest in future technology, such as the
development of seeds with traits that produce higher-yielding, highervalue and drought-tolerant crops ....In short, these few growers who
save and replant patented seed jeopardize the future availability of
innovative biotechnology for all growers. And that's not fair to
anyone.76

However, beyond a biological control of the traits in the affected
seeds, GURTs heavily impact on the environment and global agriculture in
a variety of ways, hence, the widespread alarm and condemnation from
several social activist groups, scientific bodies, international organizations,
and many segments of the civil society.77 For example, the Consultative
73. See Traitor Resolutions, supra note 71.
74. Monsanto v. Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.T. 256 (Can.).
75. See Traitor Resolutions, supra note 71.
76. See Crouch, supra note 4.
77. For example, the FAO's Panel of Eminent Experts on Ethics in Food and Agriculture
noted that, "[t]he Panel unanimously stated that the 'terminator seeds' generally are unethical,
finding it unacceptable to market seeds, the offspring of which a farmer cannot use again because
the seeds could not germinate." FAO'S PANEL OF EMINENT EXPERTS ON ETHICS INFOOD AND
AGRICULTURE, First Session, Rome, 26-28 September 2000. Similarly, Dr. M.S. Swaminathan,
former independent chairman of the FAO Council and recipient of the World Food Prize, warned
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Group on International Agricultural Research ("CGIAR") in its policy
adopted on 30 October 1998 warned that,
The CGIAR will not incorporate into its breeding materials any genetic
systems designed to prevent seed germination. This is in recognition of
(a) concerns over potential risks of its inadvertent or unintended spread
through pollen; (b) the possibilities of sale or exchange of viable seed
for planting; (c) the importance of farm-saved seed, particularly to
resource-poor farmers; (d) potential negative impacts on genetic
diversity; and (e) the importance of farmer selection and breeding for
sustainable agriculture.78
Condemning terminator seeds, the Director General of the Food and
Agriculture Organization ("FAO"), Dr. Jacques Diof warned, "[w]e are
against [terminator genes]. We are happy to see that in the end some of the
in implementing these
main multinationals which have been involved
79
terminator genes have decided to backtrack.
Acting on these warnings, some countries such as India, Ghana and
Panama have taken steps to place a moratorium on the so-called terminator
seeds technology in their own countries.8" However, seed companies
counter that GURT seeds enable farmers to activate or deactivate genetic
traits such as disease resistance by applying a prescribed chemical to their
plants or seeds.81 It has also been argued that engineered seed sterility
would minimize genetic pollution arising from genetically modified plants.
According to this argument, engineered sterility offers an in-built safety
feature for genetically modified plants "because if genes from a terminator
crop cross-pollinate with related plants nearby, the seed produced from
unwanted pollination will be sterile ....
Given the widespread use of genetically modified crops in many parts
of the world, this argument on its face seems quite seductive.83 As a matter
that "in India where there are nearly 100 million operational holdings, denial of plant-back rights
or the use of the terminator mechanism will be disastrous for the socio-economic and biodiversity
points of view, since over 80 percent of farmers plant their own farm-saved seeds.' See M.S.
Swaminathan, Farmers' Rights and Plant Genetic Resources, 36 BIOTECHNOLOGY &
DEVELOPMENT MONITOR 6-9 (1998), available at http://www.biotech-monitor.nl/3603.htm.
78. See Terminator Brochure, supra note 71.
79. Id. In the same vein, Dr. Gordon Conway, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, in
his speech to the Monsanto company Board of Directors in June 1999, counselled that "the
agricultural seed industry must disavow use of the terminator technology to produce seed sterility
...the possible consequences, if farmers who are unaware of the characteristics of terminator
seed purchase it and attempt to reuse it, are certainly negative and may outweigh any social
benefits of protecting innovation." See Segarra, supra note 8.
80. See Traitor Resolutions, supra note 68.
81. Eaton, supra note 3, available at http://www.biotech-monitor.ni/4907.htm.
82. See Segarra, supra note 8.
83. There are, however, other new techniques of genetic modification that do not allow the
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of fact, with the increasing use of genetically modified crops in agriculture,
there is a growing body of evidence supporting the fear of genetic pollution
arising from escaped genes. For example, the Mexican Ministry of
Environment confirmed in January 2002 that indigenous farmers' maize
varieties in Oaxaca and Puebla "have been contaminated with DNA from
genetically modified maize."84
While supporters of terminator technology have argued that the
technology may in fact be deployed to prevent genetic pollution arising
from stray transgenic matter, critics of the technology have countered that
because of the vagaries of farming and the phenomenon of "gene
silencing," terminator technology may not be an effective antidote to
genetic pollution.85 As Martha Crouch has observed, it is very unlikely that
tetracycline treatment of terminator seeds will be 100% effective.86 In her
words:
[S]ome seeds may not respond, or take up enough tetracycline to
activate recombinase. In such cases, the plants growing from the
unaffected seeds would look just like all the others, but would grow up
to make pollen carrying non-fimctional toxic gene. The pollen would
also carry the genetically-engineered protein supposedly being
protected by terminator, such as herbicide-tolerance. If this pollen
fertilized a normal plant, the seed would not die, because no toxin
would be made, but the seed would now have the herbicide-tolerance
gene and could pass that on. Thus a trait from the [§enetically
modified organism] would have escaped through the pollen.
Secondly, the phenomenon of gene silencing could wreck the
permutations of the molecular biologist.8" Tests and experiments have
shown that in some cases, previously active genes may suddenly stop
working.89 In other words, if the phenomenon of gene silencing occurs in
respect to terminator seeds (and there is no reason why it may not occur),
plants containing the silenced "toxin gene could grow and reproduce,

transfer of genes through pollen. An example is chloroplast engineering.
84. Fear-ReviewedScience: Contaminated Corn & Tainted Tortillas-GeneticPollution in
Mexico's Centre of Maize Diversity, ETC GROUP, (Jan./Feb. 2002), available at
http://www.etcgroup.org/article.asp?newsid=287 (last visited Sept. 12, 2004); See also D. Quist
& I. Chapela, Transgenic DNA Introgressed into Traditional Maize Landraces in Oaxaca,
Mexico, 414 NATURE 541, 541-43 (Nov. 29, 2001).
85. Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, The Development Impact of Genetic use Restriction
Technologies: A Forecast Based on the Hybrid Crop Experience (unpublished manuscript to
appear in Environment andDevelopment Economics, on file with the author).
86. Crouch, supranote 4.
87. Id.
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perhaps for several generations."9 Clearly, one cannot rely on terminator
technology as the panacea for the escape of transgenic material into the
environment. The instability and unreliability of genetically engineered
seeds make them the unlikely candidate for the vanguard of a new world of
scientific experimentation. 91
"In Canada, the escape of transgenes from [genetically modified
(GM)] canola is a menace for organic farmers who cannot certify their
canola crops as GM-free." 92 Indeed, as the ETC Group has argued, "the
rationalization that terminator technology is beneficial as a biosafety tool
that will prevent the spread of GM genes is a tacit admission that
genetically engineered crops are not environmentally safe." 93 However, the
ETC Group further argues: "Food security for poor people must not be
sacrificed to solve the industry's genetic pollution problems."94 The ETC
Group has further argued that:
It is erroneous and irresponsible to suggest that agriculture is
dependent on genetic seed sterilization as a method for containing
unwanted pollution from GM plants. This is like bringing home a tiger
to catch a house mouse. In promoting terminator as a "green" solution
to GM pollution, industry is pushing its most profitable and
monopolistic option by off-loading the whole GM burden on farmers
while increasing corporate control. If GM seeds are unsafe they
should not be used. If they have polluted, clean-up costs should rest
with the companies. 95
Fears of genetic pollution arising from terminator seeds are not
unfounded and must be taken seriously. In some cases, the polluted plants
cannot be distinguished by mere sight. Only when they are replanted and
fail to germinate would the affected realize that his or her farm seeds had
been unintentionally sterilized. Hence, farmers whose crops are exposed to
farms using terminator seeds stand a probable risk of genetic pollution and
seed sterilization. It is very difficult to manually prevent against pollen
cross-fertilization and the consequential sterilization arising from such
contamination with genetically engineered plants.
Another real hazard with terminator seed patents is that the seeds of
90.

Id.

91.
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visited Sept. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Sterile Harvest].
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.

2004]

THE "TERMINATOR" PA TENT

such crops such as cotton may not be edible to both humans and animals
because of the increased toxicity of the seeds. There are potential changes
to the nutritional contents and value of the seeds that have had several
proteins in them destroyed by artificially induced toxic agents. There are
lots of unknowns relating to the functional properties of proteins at several
stages of a plant's development and it would be presumptuous to assume
that the induced toxicity of the seeds would merely stop at the seeding or
germination stage.
Apart from risks to humans, it is common knowledge that birds, other
animals, et cetera, forage on some of the affected crops. Given the cyclical
nature of consumption, terminator seeds pose a severe and clear risk not
only to humans, but other living factors in the food chain. More troubling,
again, is the issue of allergy to humans. Although the toxins in question
may not be directly poisonous to animals, it is possible that they may cause
allergenic reactions, particularly, if they are mixed up in the general food
supply chain without adequate warning or notice to the public. A report
from the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity has
advocated caution in the deployment of terminator seeds.96
Another unresolved problem with terminator seeds is the potential
difficulty with storage. As Martha Crouch queries, "[w]ill the dead seeds
be more or less easy to store?"97 Perhaps they will respond differently to
changes in humidity, or to infection with bacteria and fungi.9 8 "If dead
seeds do behave differently, even a few 'bad apples may spoil the barrel,'
and the problem of partial killing of neighbor's crops may be even be more
of an issue."9 9 Arguing further in the same breath, Martha Crouch raises
the difficult question of the impact of use of tetracycline to set the cascade
of gene-toxin activation in motion. 00 In her words,
If seed companies do indeed use tetracycline ... then they will have to
soak a very large amount of the seed in the antibiotic .... [E]very seed
planted by the farmer will have to be so treated. How many pounds of
cottonseed or wheat seed are needed to plant an acre, and how many
acres will be put in? ... At any rate, even at low concentrations there
will be a lot of tetracycline to handle and dispose of, and large-scale
agricultural uses of antibiotics are already seen as a threat to their
medical uses. Further, the increased tolerance of bacteria, residual or
96. Convention on Biological Diversity, Consequences of the Use of the New Technology for
the Control of Plant Gene Expression for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological

Diversity, May 17, 1999, UNEP/CBD/SBTTA/4/9/Rev. 1.
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waste antibiotics may also have a harmful effect on soil ecology. 1' 1
Another interesting angle to the debate on terminator seeds is the
impact of such technologies on farmers' rights to save and replant farmsaved seeds. It is interesting to note that over the centuries, farmers across
the globe have labored under the impression that they have a right to use
saved seeds. Contemporary international law on ownership of seeds has
acknowledged the existence of a farmers' privilege on the subject.'
Article 9 of the new FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture, reiterates the right of farmers to use farm-saved
seeds. 0 ' The end result of terminator seeds is to frustrate the exercise of
this right. Remarkably, most scholars of international law on the
ownership of seeds and plants have not addressed this question."°
Virtually all studies and research by the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations conclude that terminator patents will diminish, if not
truncate, Farmers' Rights if such seeds are widely used. 5
These are legitimate and serious concerns that should compel the
attention of advocates of terminator seeds, policy-makers, and the
legislature. The myriad and complex interactions between microorganisms,
plants, animals, et cetera, are clearly affected by the deployment of
terminator seeds.0 6 How and in what scale this experiment in ecological
engineering will play out in the larger scheme of things is at best a matter
of speculation, but all available evidence suggests that caution should be
the watchword.0 7
Beyond cautionary approaches to environmental
integrity and sustainable agriculture, terminator patents also implicate
rights recognized in international law and which states are obliged to
enforce in domestic law. 0 8
Despite the trenchant criticisms that have assailed terminator seeds,
101. Id. See also JANE RISSLER & MARGARET MELLON, THE ECOLOGICAL RISKS OF
ENGINEERED CROPS (The MIT Press, 1996).
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Agriculture, Ninth Regular Session, CGRFA-9/02/17 Annex. E, Rome (Oct. 14-18 2002).
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the biotechnology industry and some public institutions are aggressively
acquiring new terminator patents and deploying the patented seeds in the
fields.1" 9 The major owners of patents on terminator seeds include
Syngenta, Pharmacia (Monsanto), DuPont, BASF, Delta & Pine Land,
USDA, Cornell, Purdue, and Iowa State Universities."° With the merger of
Monsanto and AstraZeneca with some other companies involved in the
deployment of terminator seeds, there is little doubt that the initial promises
of the original patentees of terminator not to deploy terminator seeds has
To date, Syngenta, "the world's largest
been overtaken by new realities.'
agri-business firm, holds the largest arsenal of Terminator patents ... 2
with at least seven patents.
The profound implications of these technologies, and the conflicts
they create with other rights and interests in society, have not been lost on
activists, policy experts, farmers and other segments of the civil society
with interests in food security, patent law policy, and environmental
integrity." 3 The question thus arises as to whether these technologies are
useful inventions within the context of modern patent law on utility.
In resolving this conundrum, it has to be borne in mind that utility in
patent law is a technical word. However, its technicality has not
completely dispensed with elements of its original reference to social
usefulness. Ideally, patent law on utility must resolve the issue of social
relevance and technical predictability in equal measure. The extraordinary,
indeed perpetual, control over seeds vested in the hands of the GURT
patent holders renders patent protection redundant save for the purposes of
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lines ....
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corralling infringers of the technology. In sum, while GURT patents meet
the technical arm of the requirement on utility, there is little doubt that in
the overall scheme of societal benefits, GURT patents push patent law to
extreme limits, requiring sober deliberation and debate by all interested
persons in society."'
CONCLUSION
This article has shown how the concept of social usefulness was
indeed the driving force behind the institutionalization of the patent system.
In addition, at the early stages of patent law, social usefulness assumed a
puritanical and preaching tone. The courts and the patent offices visited
inventions that were deemed immoral or mischievous with the wrath of
rejection. However, as more scientists were appointed to the patent offices
as examiners, the moralistic aspect or perspective of the patent office in the
construction of utility of inventions began to diminish. The pre-eminent
consideration in the test of utility became mechanical operability rather
than debatable questions of ethics or immoral uses to which an invention
could be deployed. Nevertheless, social usefulness never really withered
away entirely from the jurisprudence on utility. It lay dormant and was
largely supplanted with legislative provisions expressly debarring certain
inventions from patentability.
With respect to terminator technologies, the question is whether, in
the absence of clear statutory exception from patentability, the criterion of
utility may be invoked to impugn such patents. The answer seems to be in
the negative. This response is largely a reflection of the disengagement by
the patent office with issues surrounding the environmental implications of
inventions to be patented by inventors. Put simply, the modem patent
office is designed to patent as many inventions as possible unless there are
clear statutory bars to the patentability of such inventions. If the patent
system is to be accountable for how it deals with controversial inventions,
public inquiry and concern should be channelled to the legislative arm of
the government. The test of utility can no longer be relied on to deal with
inventions lacking in social usefulness or that push the boundaries of what
is morally acceptable, even when such inventions, as for example,
terminator seeds, clearly violate other established rights such as farmers'
rights.
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